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Governments and donor agencies are dedicating larger and larger amounts of resources to 
micro-finance programs with the goal of achieving broader access to financial services by 
micro-entrepreneurs and low-income population groups.  The IDB-supported Global 
Micro-Enterprise Credit Program found that a relatively small component of the program 
has had a disproportional impact on achieving this goal.  While over $60M was devoted 
to the credit component, a small fraction of this amount was devoted to supporting a risk 
reporting unit at the Central Bank Superintendency. The IDB assisted in the expansion of 
credit reporting to include loans of all size and also helped stimulate the emergence of a 
strengthened credit bureau industry.   
 
These relatively mundane and overlooked elements of a larger program may have 
profound impacts and benefits if the early findings are indications of longer-term trends.  
Credit professionals in Peru are reporting that these improvements have improved the 
quality and lowered the cost of the credit decision.  They have also reduced the waiting 
time of applicants.  There has been an impressive expansion of credit access for micro-
entrepreneurs.  Banks have begun to compete with each other to lend to this sector.  The 
case study also reveals a number of conditions that must be met for such a credit 
reporting system to emerge.  These include the need to ensure universal cooperation in 
reporting, reliable identification, privacy and the protection of the consumer. 
 
If the results of this case study are verified by similar results in other countries, risk-
mitigation strategies may prove to be a powerful and cost-effective strategy for 
expanding micro-finance access.  The provision of transparent credit histories lowers the 
risk of entering and serving this sector.  It also promotes a culture of repayment.  The 
poor, who have few initial assets apart from their reputation, seem to be good credit risks 
once such mechanisms are in place. Risk mitigation also helps to avoid a credit bubble.  
This case study suggests that more attention be devoted to establishing effective national 
reporting systems on arrears and delinquencies on loans of all sizes and the emergence of 
credit bureaus.  
 
Introduction 
Efforts to expand finance for microenterprise have been notable in recent  years.  It is 
helpful to ask what success would look like if it were achieved.  The ultimate goals 
would be universal access to credit by all people who could use it responsibly.  The 
following case study identifies an area, often neglected, that could have a powerful 
impact in achieving this goal.     
 
Ever since the publication of El Otro Sendero by Hernando de Soto, the constraints 
facing Peruvian micro-entrepreneurs have become legendary.  What is less well known is 
that some surprising new lessons are being learned about micro-finance from a recent 
IDB and Government of Peru initiative.    
 
The following case study from Peru, supported by the experiences of countries such as 
Uruguay, highlights the surprising impact of the emergence of credit reporting systems 
on expanding access to microfinance.  Credit reporting in Peru included both the 
expansion of mandatory credit i nformation reporting on small loans by the 
Superintendency of Banks and Insurance and the emergence of credit bureaus.   The 
following case study reveals the potential impact of this approach. By providing 
transparent information to the financial institutions on the credit history of small 
borrowers, one lowers the risk to financial institutions of lending to this sector.  This 
expands access by the poor to credit.  It also lowers the transaction costs to financial 
institutions of lending to this sector.  Furthermore, it may also promote a culture of 
repayment and help avoid a credit bubble as economies expand.   
 
The improvement of credit risk reporting may prove to be a far more cost-effective way 
of promoting nearly universal access to credit.  At the very least, it would seem to be an 
important component of a micro-finance program. 
  
 
1  Importance of the Micro-Enterprise 
Sector in Peru 
Efforts to assist the poor in Latin America have, for many years, focused on the challenge 
of enabling poorer income groups  to become productive through various initiatives 
focusing on micro-enterprise.   
 
Peru is a country where this effort is extremely important because micro-enterprise 
employs 75% of the economically active population.  According to the National 
Household Survey completed by the Ministry of Labor in 1996, there were 2,386,000 
microenterprises in operation employing approximately 6 million people.  They also 
account for approximately 40% of the GDP. 
 
Some 80% of these enterprises were in the informal sector; that is to say they did not 
have an employer tax identification number or “RUC.”
1  This meant that not only did 
they not contribute to the tax base but that they also lacked the formality that could 
enable them to get access to the formal credit system which would allow financial 
institutions to assess their credit-worthiness.   
 
Hernando de Soto, in  The Other Path, elucidating the excruciating number of steps to 
legally register a small enterprise in Peru in the 1980s, catalogued the difficulties of these 
small entrepreneurs in Peru.  The sector has been characterized by limited access to 
services, especially financial services.  Such services will be critical to the 
competitiveness and sustainability of these enterprises in an increasingly liberalized 
environment. By 1990, even the modest credit services available to the sector had largely 
collapsed. 
 
The Government of Peru has set goals for rapid economic growth and also seeks to 
achieve the broad sharing of the benefits of such growth.  Given the dimensions of the 
micro-enterprise sector in Peru, and its social importance, resolving the constraints 
affecting this sector must be a necessary part of the overall strategy.  
 
President Fujimori, upon assuming office, introduced broad reforms. As a result of these 
economic reforms, salaried employees enjoyed a rebound in their purchasing power and 
living standards, which had deteriorated sharply during the inflationary and economically 
troubled early 1990s.  The increase in demand for goods and services from this sector 
provided growing opportunities for the small and micro entrepreneurs of Peru. 
 
                                                 
1  RUC stands for “Registro Unico de Contribuyente.”  
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2  The Peruvian Financial Sector: 
From Chaos to Reform 
The Peruvian financial sector experienced major tremors and profound changes during 
the previous decade as a result of changes in the national and international economy and 
changes in government economic policy (see Exhibit 2).  The financial sector survived 
the efforts of the government in the 1980s to nationalize the private banking and 
insurance companies amidst a major financial crisis that led the IMF to declare Peru 
ineligible to receive further economic assistance.  
 
Until the early 1990s, the Peruvian financial system was made up of a variety of 
institutions including private banks, state banks, financial service companies and non-
profit credit organizations.  The economic crisis climaxed in 1990 with an inflation rate 
of 7,649% (Exhibit 3).  This led to the collapse of the financial system as evidenced by 
the closure of the state development bank, the mutual institutions and many savings and 
loan cooperatives.  The general lack of confidence in the system by the public and the 
virtual disappearance of credit at the micro-enterprise level were further symptoms of the 
breakdown.  
 
To confront this crisis, a new legal framework was introduced focusing on prudential 
norms to give greater stability and security to financial institutions and to recover public 
confidence.  Legislative Decree #637 sought to modernize the system, liberalizing the 
operations that financial institutions could undertake.  In the same year, legislation was 
introduced to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the supervisory and regulatory 
system.
2  This legislative framework was further enhanced with Legislative Decree 770 
of 1993, and Law 26702 of 1996
3 -- better known as simply “the Banking Law.”  These 
reforms gathered together constructive elements of the earlier norms and also created a 
modern model for the Peruvian financial system.   
 
These reforms liberalized the financial markets, allowing free setting of interest rates for 
both deposits and loans and eliminating direct state involvement in the financial system.  
The new legislation also gave the Superintendency the flexibility to interpret the 
regulatory norms and to afford equal treatment under the law for national and foreign 
investment.  It also simplified the regulations for the financial sector and introduced the 
concept of risk by economic group.    
 
One of the important areas touched on by the new reforms was the “Central de Riesgos” 
(Risk Center), widening the coverage of information that should be gathered and 
distributed.  The changes in the regulatory environment opened the doors for the 
                                                 
2  “Ley Organica de la Superintendencia de Banca y Seguros” of 1991. 
3  “Ley general del Sistema Financiero y del Sistema de Seguros y Orgánicas de la Superintendencia de 
Banca y Seguros” better known simply as the “Ley de Bancos.” 2.  The Peruvian Financial Sector: From Chaos to Reform 
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reappearance and expansion of popular and micro-finance credit.  The elimination of 
barriers to entry for foreign investment stimulated new products and services.  The 
deregulation of interest rate ceilings also led to the introduction of new products directed 
at the micro-finance sector.  At the same time, greater diffusion of credit information 
opened the way for a market for information, the axis of which was the Risk Center of the 
Superintendency of Banks and Insurance.   
 
The resulting improvement in the financial sector is evidenced by the growing liquidity 
of the banking sector as a percentage of GDP which increased from approximately 5.1% 
in 1990 to approximately 20% in 1998 (Exhibit 3).   
 
This situation, supported by reforms in the financial system, led to the introduction of a 
variety of financial products directed to this sector.  One of the innovators was a local 
bank, Banco Orion, with close ties to commercial houses, and three banks with Chilean 
capital connected to a major retailer of household durable and non-durable products. 
 
The first Chilean bank to establish itself in this  market was the Banco del Trabajo 
(Workers Bank) in 1994.  By 1997 there were 5 commercial banks and 2 financial 
services companies that offered personal loans to the low-income sectors (Sectors C and 
D) with a combined portfolio of US$490M.  The average loan was approximately $450 
with a minimum of $100 and a maximum of US$20,000.   
 
Structure of the Peruvian Financial System 
The Peruvian financial structure underwent a restructuring.  At the beginning of 1999 it 
was comprised of 13 “Multibancos”, 12 finance companies, 10 leasing institutions, 13 
Municipal Savings and Loan Associations, and 10 Rural Savings and Loan Associations.  
There were also a number of micro-finance development social enterprises
4,  operating 
under the jurisdiction of the Superintendency of Banks.  One of these had already 
transformed itself into a bank, called Mibanco, targeted at the micro-enterprise sector. 
The Development Finance Corporation (COFIDE) operated as a second story bank. 
Finally, there was the Banco de la Nacion, which served the Peruvian Treasury.  The 
entire system was regulated by the Central Bank
5  and by the Superintendency of 
Banking and Insurance (see Exhibit 4). 
 
Role of Foreign Banks and Role in Stimulating Innovation 
Foreign investment in the banking sector played an important role in expanding access to 
financial services by low-income sectors.  Chilean banks in particular, under the new 
legal framework, introduced new strategies and new technologies for consumer and 
micro-enterprise credit. This resulted in greater competence and competition in reaching 
this sector. Foreign investment in the banking sector was estimated at 40% of the overall 
investment in the sector.  
 
                                                 
4  Referred to as “EDPYMES” or Empresas de Desarrollo de las Pequeñas y Microempresas. 
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Relative to the prevailing prime rate of about 32%, the consumer loan rate of interest was 
relatively high and ranged from a low of 35% to 140% annualized and including 
commissions.  These rates of interest were said to be the result of the high unit cost of 
processing these loans and the higher risk associated with lending to this sector.  
However, high interest did not seem to be the principal limiting factor for credit demand 
as the interest rates offered by informal moneylenders were typically higher than this 
range.  
 
Despite these reforms, the Peruvian financial sector suffered further setbacks in 1998 as a 
result of the Asian crisis and El Niño, which slowed Peruvian growth.  The arrears rate 
(including not only arrears but also refinanced arrears) had risen by March 1998 to 8.8% 
(Exhibit 5).  Peruvian prudential norms were very exacting, even by international 
standards and required provisions for credit-at-risk on arrears of only 15 days (compared 
to 90 days in many countries) and also computed as in arrears all of the credit and not just 
the portion corresponding to the late payment.  
 
Arrears were even higher in the consumer loan and micro-finance segments.  The foreign 
banks were particularly hard hit.  They had been using technologies proven in their home 
countries (e.g. Chile) which had good information systems.  The situation revealed 
weaknesses in their client selection system.    
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3  The IDB Global Micro-Enterprise 
Credit Program 
In 1995, the IDB signed an agreement with the Government of Peru to implement the 
Global Microenterprise Credit Program through COFIDE (Development Finance 
Corporation). 
 
Objectives of Program 
The general objective of the program was to broaden access to formal credit by the 
formal and informal microenterprises in urban and rural areas so as to enable people from 
low income groups who have entrepreneurial talent to t ake advantage of economic 
opportunity.   The specific objectives were that intermediary financial institutions (IFIs) 
respond in a sustainable way to the growing microenterprise demand for credit, in 
keeping with the norms of their environment and using local resources.   
 
Program Elements 
There were two essential components of the program.  The first was the credit component 
that included $35.7M, of which IDB provided US$25M.  This credit would be handled by 
COFIDE as a second story bank, channeling resources to different institutions to be used 
to finance microenterprise.  
 
The second component, a technical cooperation, was a non-reimbursable grant of 
US$3.95M of which $2.75M was provided by the Swiss Government through 
Cooperacion Suiza para el Desarrollo (COSUDE). This objectives were to improve the 
operational capacity of COFIDE, strengthen the operating and administrative capacity of 
the participating IFIs, promote expanded access to credit among Peruvian women and 
enhance awareness of issues related to the environment.  
 
One very small component of the technical assistance program had to do with 
strengthening risk information systems.  It would broaden the array of credit information 
services offered by the Central de Riesgos of the SBS to the formal financial sector, 
focused especially on loans under $4,500, a market segment that had not previously been 
covered.   
 
In 1998, the Global Microenterprise Credit Program II was signed with a budget of 
US$42.86M, of which IDB supplied US$30M.  The new programs did not include 
technical cooperation and the budget was devoted to credit.  Because  of the growing 
recognition of the importance of a good credit risk information system, and because not 
all of the resources from the earlier technical assistance had been used, IDB decided to 
continue making some resources available for technical cooperation to broaden the 
services of the Central de Riesgos.   
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4  Central de Riesgos (CR) and the 
Emergence of Credit Bureaus  
 
Central de Riesgos (CR) 
 
The CR is a unit charged w ith gathering, processing and distributing information on 
natural and juridical persons who have debts with Peruvian financial institutions.  As a 
risk information center, the Central has been operating since 1968, although it was not 
until 1992 that banking legislation was introduced specifically referring to the term 
“Central de Riesgos.”   
 
Until 1998, the CR collected, processed and distributed within the financial sector only 
information about debts that were over the equivalent of US$4,500.  The limit was set by 
virtue of the slowness of the information processing system, which was done manually.  
At the beginning bulletins were issued every three months, with 6 months of delay, and 
sent directly to the financial institutions.  This bulletin was later published bi-monthly 
and included information regarding contingent credit and judicial “cobranzas”. In 1980, 
with the procurement of new information systems, it was possible to change the format to 
include current and contingent debt, total debt and the number of institutions with which 
the individual or enterprise had financial obligations.  Data were provided to the banks in 
the form of magnetic computer tapes.  
 
Initially, the information was provided to the banks on their own clients and those who 
had obligations with two or more credit institutions.  This was modified in 1992 and 
permitted the Superintendency to provide data on all the clients for the sector, thus 
permitting banks to perform credit checks on new potential clients.  
 
The resurgence of microenterprise in Peru by 1994 generated pressures by the consumer 
and microenterprise banking industry to generate and receive information on even small 
creditors.  This was initiated by the Superintendency, but at first with great delays.  The 
system did not have the capacity to manage the data volume generated.   
 
In 1995, as part of the technical cooperation program of Global Microenterprise Credit I, 
a new information system was designed with new technology and software attempting to 
manage this larger requirement to process risk information on small loans as well as 
large.  Initial implementation problems were experienced and, as a result, the $4,500 limit 
was maintained.   
 
Meanwhile, those banks lending to the consumer and microenterprise sector were anxious 
to have information in an agile, economic and reliable way.  This continued to motivate 
the SBS to expand the credit reporting system.  In October of 1997 a new agreement was 4.  Central de Riesgos (CR) and the Emergence of Credit Bureaus 
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reached with a different contractor to provide information.  A dual system was created.  
One was located in the SBS for debts over $4,500.  The other was located in the 
contractor’s premises for loans under $4,500.  The new system was launched in 
November of 1997.  Banks provided on tape their data and another blank tape upon 
which they would later receive the entire set of information.   
 
The early results of this information exchange were worrying.  Some clients were found 
to have 8 loans guaranteed by the same collateral and without the adequate capacity to 
pay or with debts with high levels of delinquency.  This created an even greater demand 
for information by these financial institutions. 
 
By February of 1998, this additional pressure resulted in the provision of data over the 
Internet and the contract with the information service provider was amended to reflect 
this.  Financial institutions were assigned a code and password.  There were two 
information formats.  One was for amounts over $4,500 and provided detailed 
information managed directly from SBS.  The other was for loan amounts under $4,500 
and provided less detailed information, outsourced to a data processing firm (Exhibits 6-
7).  The first system managed 170,000 registries whereas the second managed over 2 
million.   
 
Requests for credit profiles increased from 400 to 6,000 per month.  The SBS system 
now had a time lag of 3 months during which time the SBS verified and validated the 
information.  The second system, operating by Internet, had a time lag of only 23 days.   
 
With the new system functioning, the banks began to ask for additional information, such 
as credit ratings, refinancing, judicial proceedings, credit guarantees and occasions on 
which guarantors had had to provide the repayment.  It was also decided to include 
information from Savings and Loans and microfinance NGOs in the system.  Information 
was solicited from them in a standardized and specific format.  By early 1999 a total of 
51 financial institutions were reporting to the system.  Only 15 still remained outside the 
system for there to be a nearly universal credit reporting system in Peru and it was the 
goal of this initiative to have them incorporated in the coming months.  This was seen to 
be feasible as it was now a legal obligation in Peru for all regulated institutions to report 
their information to the SBS.  By early 1999, the SBS was planning to provide better 
service to the sector and to develop a new and amplified CR.  This project was 




The demand for credit reporting and the improved information availability achieved by 
SBS through the CR, permitted by 1995 the emergence of Peruvian private firms 
dedicated to collect, process and distribute information on the financial position of 
physical and juridical persons.  This information was then sold to a diverse client base.  
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The first private credit bureau to emerge was Riesgo Cero (“zero risk”).  A few months 
later, the Association of Banks decided to create their own “Central de Riesgos 
Comerciales” (CERTICOM), while at the same time a third credit bureau “INFOCORP” 
was created by two banks, Banco de Credito and Banco Wiese, two key national banks.  
Some months later, Trans Union acquired Riesgo Cero and INFORCORP was acquired 
by DICOM, a subsidiary of EQUIFAX.  These last two acquisitions showed that Peru 
was attracting the attention of two of the global leaders in the credit risk industry.   
 
The emergence of these three information agencies created increased competitiveness for 
the market.  Each service sought to offer better and more reliable service in terms of the 
breadth of the information provided and the quality, accessibility and speed with which 
information was provided.  They also competed on the basis of cost--all of which 
provided increased value to the financial institution users.   
 
These information agencies would take commercial bank credit information from CR as a 
point of departure and then add value in a number of ways.  They would supplement this 
information with additional information directly from banks.  They would then provide 
additional value to their clients by collecting and processing other kinds of information 
relevant to the credit decision such as:  
•  Verification of legitimate address, employment, housing condition and/or business 
premises. 
•  Verifying the legitimacy of the identity card and name of the person on the National 
Identification Registry and Civil Status (RENIEC). 
•  Verification of registration with the tax authorities and that taxes have been paid.
6 
•  Information on any possible protests filed at the Chamber of Commerce regarding 
IOUs, warrants or unfulfilled guarantees.  
•  Credit information from commercial houses. 
•  Credit information from the telephone, electricity and cable companies. 
•  Updating and cleaning the data base through cross-referencing the above information. 
 
Contracts with credit bureaus would be through monthly charge according to the size of 
the client, which would provide for a certain minimum number of free credit reports per 
month.  There were also contracts on a per-request basis and the average cost per credit 
report was $1.   
 
Access to information from the credit bureaus was made in various ways.  Clients could 
have interconnected systems through host-to-host servers, dedicated lines or through the 
Internet.  Information could also be obtained through tapes, diskettes and fax.  At the 
beginning of 1999, one of the credit bureaus had begun offering service through an 800 
number.   
 
By early 1999, the credit bureaus typically had between 300 and 700 institutional clients 
and managed databases with approximately 4 million “registros” each.  The information 
flows to credit bureaus are presented in diagram form in Exhibit 8.   
                                                 
6  This was done through the “Registro Nacional de Identificacion y del Estado Civil (RENIEC).  
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5  Evaluating the Impacts and Issues 
in Peru 
 
One immediate positive impact of the introduction of the CR reporting systems and the 
credit bureaus was that of improving the quality of the credit decision .  A representative 
of the Banco del Trabajo commented: 
 
“The CR and the credit bureaus have had a favorable impact, permitting greater 
access to information.  Before, only information on credit over $4,500 was 
reported.  At the moment, for every 10 loan applications that we receive, 5.7 are 
registered, that is have some kind of debt. This shows the importance of having 
available information to filter clients so as to restrict ourselves to lending to those 
who are not over-indebted or having problems with late payments elsewhere.” 
 
Improved credit reporting also  lowered the cost of transaction.  According to Marco 
Amez of COFIDE: 
 
“A bank can now take a decision in minutes evaluating an application and 
rejecting it if there are problems or data inconsistencies.”   
 
It was, perhaps, too early in Peru to see these economies and efficiencies translated into 
savings for the borrower, but it was expected that the combination of greater competition, 
lower risk and savings in transaction costs would lead to more competitive offerings of 
financial products to Peruvians.   
 
Mr. Higueras of INFOCORP agreed with this assessment and highlighted another 
implication for the loan applicant:  
 
“Credit bureaus lower the cost of credit evaluation and have reduced the waiting 
time of loan applicants from a week to 24 hours.” 
 
The importance of timely credit to microenterprise has been well documented in 
numerous studies that have demonstrated that timely credit is often more valuable to the 
entrepreneur than less timely credit even when the latter is offered at significantly lower 
interest rates. 
 
Another impact was that of lowering the barrier to entry.  As information has become 
more transparent and more available, it makes it easier for new financial institutions to 
enter the sector or for existing financial institutions to enter the consumer and 
microenterprise niches of the market serving lower income population groups. 
Microenterprise barriers of entry to formal finance are also lowered. 
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Ronal Bourgeois of CREDISUR explained: 
 
“From the moment we had access to information, our rejection of new loan 
applicants went up by 20% because of the high level of existing debt reported.  
We found many applicants that had already as many as 8 loans, many of them 
already delinquent.  A serious financial institution should not work without access 
to a CR as they should know about the debt capacity of their loan applicants, their 
current delinquencies and their past and current behavior with regard to loan 
repayment.” 
 
Alfonso Higueras of INFOCORP noted the positive impact in terms of expanded access 
to credit.  “We have been able to create synergy with credit institutions so as to permit a 
massification in a sector that before did not have access.”   
 
The system also was seen as having a positive impact in creating a culture of repayment.  
As people and enterprises have gotten to know and understand that unpaid debts have 
consequences for future access to credit, they have begun to make greater efforts to honor 
their commitments on a timely basis.  This had an influence on the “pyramid of payment” 
or the hierarchy of priorities that people assign to their financial commitments and debts.   
 
Issues Involved in Credit Reporting in Peru 
 
The issue of individual privacy is closely associated with protection for the consumer.  
Errors in credit records can have a negative impact on the prospects for credit for an 
individual.  Therefore, the system must be responsive to consumers who want to check 
the accuracy of their credit report and errors must be corrected on a timely basis.  In Peru, 
the institution charged with defending the rights of the consumer is INDECOPI.  To date, 
INDECOPI has not received complaints but is worried about the existence of errors in 
credit reports.  INDECOPI representatives said they would not intervene as long as 
consumers had the right to review their reports and get errors corrected.  
 
Oscar Ballon, Director of CERTICOM suggested: 
 
“There should be norms that regulate the kind of enterprise offering this service.  
The management of information implies power, especially when dealing with 
credit information.  This should be entrusted to persons with sufficient moral 
solvency, in addition to the technical capacity to manage a data base.” 
 
Another issue is achieving  nearly universal reporting.  The active participation of all 
major financial institutions in providing information is critical to the credibility and 
success of a credit reporting system.  Luis Bicchio, Director of Finance of the Banco del 
Trabajo noted: 
 
“There was some resistance to providing this information, especially from banks 
who had a relatively good internal information reporting system.  These banks 5.  Evaluating the impacts and issues in Peru 
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didn’t  want to make their credit information on their clients available to their 
competition, especially when they were providing a lot of information by their 
size and others were providing much less.  For this reason, they were only 
reporting information on bad clients.  As of January, 1999, they must report all of 
the information.  To ensure reporting, there should be official requirements to 
provide all of this information to the supervisory authorities.”   
 
Financial institutions also have legitimate concerns regarding the provision of proprietary 
information and its  potential use by competitors.  Socorro Heysen, Deputy Banking  
Superintendent, indicated: 
 
“At the moment, we don’t have problems with regard to the turning over of 
information.  The problem was o pposition by some banks in turning over 
information desegregated by institution.  This has been resolved by aggregating 
all the data and not identifying the clients by financial institution.  Also, credit 
reports are made on a one-by-one basis.  Only if a person has late payments is the 
bank indicated to which the debt is delinquent.”     
 
There is the need to avoid the free rider problem whereby some financial institutions seek 
the benefits of credit reporting without providing information on their own operations.  In 
Peru, the reporting regulations have been seen as a way to resolve this issue.  There is 
also a need to explain the benefits of the system to the financial community.   
  
The appropriate use of rapidly evolving technology is another issue that must be 
managed.  The rapid expansion of Internet Service Providers, bandwidth capacity and 
telecommunications availability in Latin America, along with the expansion in computing 
power at lower and lower costs, provide new possibilities for collecting, processing and 
disseminating credit information with high levels of quality control and transparency.   
  
12 
6  Case Lessons: Conditions for an 
Effective Credit Reporting System  
 
The case provides lessons regarding the conditions necessary for an effective credit 
reporting system.    
 
The first condition is a clear delineation of roles of the private and public sectors.  There 
are dangers of both under- and over-regulation as roles are being redefined. The public 
sector has generally retrenched from its prior role as a credit provider to socially 
important groups such as small farmers and small businesses.  The private sector is 
expected to fill the breach but the gap in access often remains severe.  Governments in 
Latin America are searching for the appropriate roles to achieve economic and social 
goals in this new paradigm.  In some countries, credit reporting is largely a private sector 
function.  In other cases, detailed reporting is required by the Central Bank.  In Peru, the 
CR provides the regulatory framework, clearing house and reporting architecture; private 
banks and the credit bureaus do the rest. 
 
The second condition is the  need for universality of reporting.  If not all banks or 
financial institutions report their information, the value of credit reporting is much 
reduced.  There is the temptation for financial institutions to want to have a free ride--to 
enjoy the benefits of getting credit reports without having to provide information.  In 
some cases this is handled by not providing credit reports to institutions that do not share 
information.  In cases such as Peru, there are formal reporting requirements established 
by the legal and regulatory framework that accomplish this.  
 
The third condition is that of reliable identification.  In Peru, the emergence of effecive 
credit reporting coincided with improvements in the national identity card system. Even 
in countries such as the USA that do not require a national identity card, the social 
security number serves the same function.  As digital technology creates the possibility 
for smart cards, the technical and economic feasibility for introducing reliable 
identification systems will improve.  
 
The fourth condition is  individual privacy and protection.  Inaccurate information can 
cause economic and psychological hardship to people.  It can be misused to intentionally 
cause damage.  Therefore it is necessary to safeguard the rights of people to see their 
credit reports and to get prompt action to correct any false or misleading information.  
Credit bureaus must provide free copies of credit reports to the individuals and take 
prompt action to verify or correct wrong information that has been brought to their 
attention. A credit reporting system will not endure nor engender cooperation if the 
appropriate safeguards for personal privacy do not exist.  
 6.  Case lessons: conditions for an effective credit reporting system   
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A fifth condition is protection of confidentiality  and legitimate commercial interest.  
Financial institutions have made enormous investments in cultivating a good client base.  
They do not want their client lists or their lists of good versus bad credit risks shared 
broadly with competitors.  As a result, credit reporting is usually made available on a 
case by case basis.  Credit bureaus, to maintain their credibility, must ensure that their 
main data lists are not transferred wholesale.  One must therefore have safeguards in 
place.     
15 
7  Case Lessons: Benefits   
 
This brief case study illustrates the potential benefits of an institutionalized and effective 
credit risk reporting system.  These are all the more important for being generally 
undervalued and poorly understood.  
 
Transparent risk reporting systems are a cost-effective way of promoting broader access 
to credit by small and low-income borrowers.  In the case of Peru, over $60M was spent 
on credit and only very modest investments were made in expanding the technical 
capability of the CR and credit bureaus.  The case suggests that this "detail" should in 
fact be a central aspect of micro-finance strategy.  
 
The development of an effective credit risk reporting system lowers the barriers to entry.   
It does this by lowering both the risk and the transaction cost of obtaining and processing 
good information relevant to the credit decision.  It thereby encourages financial 
institutions to lend to this sector.  One surprising finding in Peru was that new entrants 
targeted the SME sector because the larger firms were already taken.  The SME sector 
was also a high growth sector.  
 
Third, it encourages competition among financial institutions to lend to this sector.  The 
desirable outcome is that private financial institutions compete with each other to serve 
this sector.  Financial institutions begin to innovate with strategies, financial products and 
technologies to effectively lend to this sector. In Peru, the entry of Chilean banks brought 
in their own technologies and approaches for lending to this sector.  
 
Fourth, effective credit reporting  lowers the risk of a financial bubble.  Emerging 
economies that begin to grow after reform experience a growth in credit demand.  Banks 
tend to respond by expanding their lending.  However, if there is no good risk reporting 
system in place, the risk during a downturn is greater.   
 
A fifth benefit promotes a culture of repayment, especially once the telephone, cable and 
electric companies begin using credit histories.  The priorities for payment begin to shift 
once there are consequences for delaying or defaulting on one's credit payments.  Oddly 
enough,  poor people are often better credit risks, once such systems have been 
established.  This is because their reputation is often their principal asset.  They also tend 
to view their line of credit as a lifeline and value it more.  However, this is not automatic.  
In many countries, past paternalistic policies and close political and governmental 
involvement in the financial sector serving rural and poorer constituencies has led to a 
culture of non-repayment.  The case shows ways to address this problem and facilitate the 
transition.  
 
This case has shown how the expansion of credit risk reporting to include small and 
micro loans led to the development of credit bureaus and a large expansion of credit as RISK MITIGATION AS A COST-EFFECTIVE MICRO-FINANCE STRATEGY 
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private financial institutions began to compete with each other to serve this sector.  They 
did this, in part, because they were able to use this information to evaluate risk and lower 
the transaction costs of lending to small entrepreneurs and low-income population 
groups.  Developments in information technology make such systems every day more 
feasible and cost-effective.  Yet, this component of micro-finance strategy is relatively 
neglected despite the high levels of resources being deployed.  Should risk mitigation 
play a more leading role in micro-finance strategy?  What have been the experiences in 
other countries?  This case study has implications for Peru.  More importantly, it may 
have unexpected and compelling implications for global microfinance strategy.  Could it 
be that the design of financial architecture will have, in the end, more impact than 
additional increments of credit through existing structures?  Is providing microfinance 
credit through traditional structures like putting new wine into old wineskins?  The case 











The Peruvian Microenterprise Sector 
Number of Microenterprises  2,386,000 
Direct Employment  6,000,000 
Employment/Economically Active Population  75% 
Percent of GDP  40% 
Sector of Impact  Low Income 
Degree of Informal Activity  80% not registered in the SUNAT 
(tax authority) 
Principal Activity  Commerce 













Recent evolution of the Peruvian financial sector 
Year  Event 
1987  Nationalization of the banking system 
1988  Reversal of the nationalization 
1992  Hyperinflation.  Collapse of the sector.  Disappearance of state banking institutions, and 
savings and loan cooperatives. 
1993  Liberalization of foreign investment in the sector and of interest rates.  Entrance of 
municipal savings and loans associations in microenterprise financing. 
1994  Incursion by foreign banks, especially in microcredit for consumers and microenterprise. 
1995  Deregulation of consumer credit enterprises, mutuals, and mortgage banks.  Broadening 
and strengthening of prudential norms. 
1996  New Banking Legislation 
  







Principal economic indicators for Peru 
Year  GDP change (%)  Inflation (%)  Total Banking System 
Liquidity 
1988  -8.3  1,722.3  7.5 
1989  -11.7  3,321.3  7.7 
1990  -3.7  7,592.3  5.1 
1991  2.9  409.5  7.0 
1992  -1.7  73.5  9.6 
1993  6.4  48.6  11.6 
1994  13.1  23.7  13.5 
1995  7.3  11.1  15.0 
1996  2.4  11.5  18.0 
1997  6.9  8.6  19.4 









































Quality of Universal Bank Portfolios (% gross commitments) 
Portfolio at Risk  Portfolio at Risk and Refinanced 
 
Bank  Dec. 96  Dec. 97  Mar. 98  Dec. 96  Dec. 97  Mar. 98 
Bank of  Boston  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Citibank  3.9  1.2  0.5  4.0  1.2  1.1 
Del País  N/A  0.5  1.6  N/A  4.6  7.7 
República  1.3  1.8  2.3  8.6  4.0  4.0 
Sudamericano  2.8  1.8  2.4  2.5  2.0  2.6 
Nuevo Mundo  1.8  2.3  3.1  3.0  4.2  5.0 
Financiero  6.6  3.0  3.1  14.6  4.8  4.6 
Standard Chartered  3.1  3.1  3.8  3.8  3.9  4.6 
Del Progreso  2.4  3.2  4.2  7.1  5.1  6.1 
Lima  5.3  4.6  4.9  8.7  7.6  8.2 
Interamericano  5.0  7.4  5.2  5.0  16.0  7.7 
Del Trabajo  4.3  4.5  5.5  4.3  6.7  8.3 
Wiese  4.7  4.8  5.8  8.4  9.4  10.1 
Interbank  8.2  5.6  5.9  11.4  8.4  8.8 
Banex   7.5  5.1  5.9  10.8  8.0  7.8 
Orion  4.2  4.0  5.9  4.2  5.1  8.1 
Crédito  3.9  5.1  6.0  4.9  6.7  7.5 
Continental  5.8  5.1  6.2  9.8  9.7  10.7 
Bancosur  8.4  6.2  6.6  10.3  10.2  10.5 
Norbank  9.9  8.6  7.6  12.4  10.0  9.0 
Latino  7.5  6.5  7.6  12.8  10.2  10.9 
Comercio  9.8  7.4  8.8  19.2  14.8  17.8 
Solventa  4.2  8.5  11.2  9.4  13.5  14.2 
Serbanco  1.8  9.9  12.0  1.9  10.4  12.9 
Santander  6.9  9.0  12.7  8.2  9.8  13.6 























To  xx/xx/xx 
 




Accumulated Direct Debt       
Arrears (less than 60 days)       
Arrears (60 days or more)       
Accumulated Indirect Debt       
Accumulated Guaranteed Debt       
Credit Line       
  















Categories  To xx/xx/xx 
  Soles  US$ 
To xx/xx/xx 
  Soles  US$ 
Current Account Overdrafts     
Letters of Credit     
IOUs     
Loans     
Leases     
Commitments for Import Finance     
Refinanced Credit     
Interest and Commissions Receivable     
Interest and Commissions Suspended     
ARREARS 
  Up to 4 months 
  More than 4 months 
  Arrears being settled in court 
   
UNDISBURSED CREDIT     
INDIRECT DEBTS 
  Outstanding Guarantees 
  Credit Cards Issued 
   
GUARANTEES 
  Guaranteed Deposits 
  Personal Guarantees 
  Embargoes 
  Machinery and Equipment 
  Real Estate 
  Mortgages 
  Warrants 
  Merchandise 
  Inventory 
  Other Guarantees 
   










FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS  CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE  NOTARIES AND 
LEGAL JUDGMENTS 
CENTRAL DE RIESGOS (CR) 
SUPERINTENDENCY OF 
BANKS 
CREDIT BUREAUS  CABLE TV 
TAX AUTHORITIES 
 (only those in arrears) 
COMMERCIAL HOUSES  PUBLIC SERVICES 
(Electricity) RISK MITIGATION AS A COST-EFFECTIVE MICRO-FINANCE STRATEGY 
 






MINI CASE STUDY:  CLEARING DE INFORMES – MONTEVIDEO 
 
Kevin X. Murphy 
 
“Somos fieles a nuestra historia” 
(We are faithful to our history) 
 
December 26, 1998 
 
 
Those who work in the area of micro-finance seek to achieve the democratization of 
credit.  One key question is “what would success look like?”  Another way of asking the 
same question is “how will we know when we have achieved our goal?”  One answer to 
these questions can be found in Montevideo. 
 
Uruguay—Nearly Universal Access to Credit 
 
In Uruguay, there is nearly universal access to credit for those who know how to manage 
credit responsibly.  For example, one can pick up the local newspaper and find ads for 
small consumer loans.  One calls the number and over the telephone the informal credit 
provider checks one´s name and number and if the credit reference is good tells the 
individual where to drop off a photocopy of this documents and pick up the money later 
the same afternoon. 
 
How did Uruguay achieve this surprising access?  There are a number of factors.  For 
example, Uruguay never had the kind of devastating inflation that was experienced in 
neighboring Argentina and Brazil.  One important contributing  factor is the existence of 
an excellent credit bureau and credit reporting system.  The following is the case history 
of the company that created the credit reporting industry and helped contribute to this 
successful result.  The story is based on interviews with the current CEO of the company 
and who is also the son of the founder. 
The Origin of the Credit Reporting Industry in Montevideo 
 
In 1954, a publisher in Montevideo made a substantial sale one day on credit to a 
distributor.  In the late afternoon, over coffee, he reported this with satisfaction to a few 
colleagues in one of the cafes of Montevideo.  One of his friends told him, “be very 
careful—I once made a sizeable sale on credit to that person and had a hard time later 
getting him to pay. 
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Instead of focusing on this problem or merely thanking his friend for the advice, the 
founder of Uruguay´s credit reporting industry said, “that information you have just given 
me is very valuable.  I bet other people would also find it valuable.”  He spent the next 
six months gathering information on people who paid and people who did not.  After six 
months, he began selling this information to business people.  It is sometimes said that 
“credit reporting existed before credit” and definitely grew along with it. 
 
Companies were also willing to share information about those who paid and those who 
didn´t knowing that this would enable them to get a vastly expanded base of information.  
Over time, the credibility of the business community grew thanks to the confidence in the 
business ethics of Clearing.  “We don´t sell lists of good clients to anyone,” say Clearing 
executives.  Reports are sold on a one-by-one basis.  Many banks and companies view 
their own base of knowledge of reliable customers as an asset they do not want shared. 
 
Operations of Clearing de Informes 
 
Clearing keeps data bases on delinquencies and on outstanding non-payments that have 
not been reconciled.  It does not provide information on outstanding court cases as many 
of these are settled out of court and there is no way to verify this.  “We don´t include 
anything in our data bank that cannot be confirmed, “ say Clearing executives.  These 
operations are facilitated by the existence of a national identity card which is commonly 
provided for important financial transactions. 
 
The company now provides over 200,000 individual credit reports per month.  It manages 
sophisticated computer systems that constantly maintain and update credit files. 
 
Those seeking access to the Clearing data base normally pay $50 per month which gives 
them the right to 50 reports after which the rate is $1.40 per report.  These are simple 
one-page reports that indicate the recent credit history of the individual and whether there 
are any late payments recorded of instances of non-payment.  Indications of non-
payment, once rectified, are kept for a period of 4 years after which they no longer appear 
on the record. 
 
Today in Montevideo, it is hard to get a loan, an apartment or even a telephone line 
without a good credit report.  Even state-owned companies such as the telephone 
company, insist on such a report creating the impression in the minds of some that 
Clearing is somehow sanctioned by the government despite it being a purely private 
enterprise. 
 
Knowing the payment history is also seen as superior to the traditional practice of 
requiring 3 letters from commercial and professional contacts as most people are astute 
enough to request such letters from people who will speak well of them. 
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Issues and concerns 
 
  Privacy 
 
In 44 years of operation there have only been 5-6 lawsuits brought against the company 
and none have resulted in any liability for the company.  All consumers have the right, 
free of charge, to review their credit reports and to request corrections to any aspect that 
they view is not correct.  Clearing has a Consumer Department geared to providing this 
service and to answering questions. Users of the service promise not to divulge the 
information obtained.  Some people ask what right Clearing has to collect and divulge 
information about individuals.  The company responds that it simply passes on 
information provided by others and does not make judgements on any individual.  It also 
notes that those who have a history of ethical financial practices have no worries. 
 
Getting Cooperation  
 
The system is dependent on the voluntary supplying of credit information by banks, 
finance companies and others who sell on credit.  At times it was difficult to get this 
information from rural towns where there usually only one or two major credit providers 
who knew their client base well.  One way to encourage the p rovision of such 
information is to impose conditions by not allowing access to the credit reporting system 





There have been as many as 20 attempts to form alternative credit bureaus but to date 
none has been able to rival Clearing.  Access to information puts the company in a 




With the creation and promotion of UruguayNet (an intra country network) by Antel, the 
Uruguayan telephone company, the ability to gather and disseminate credit reports took a 
leap forward.  The cost of a credit report is only that of a local phone call and US$1.40 
per credit report.  Antel had promoted widespread access to the Internet and especially 
UruguayNet as a means of increasing demand and utilization of telephone services which 
are 100% digital.  It has become a powerful vehicle for Clearing de Informes as 
UruguayNet has good national coverage and penetration.  Telephone and Internet rates 
are the lowest in Latin America.  Some 80% of the credit reports are via direct contact 
with Clearings data base.  The system operates at a relatively quick 64 baud and there are 
70 lines available to customers.  The computer system fails at a rate of less than one hour RISK MITIGATION AS A COST-EFFECTIVE MICRO-FINANCE STRATEGY 
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per year.  Although the system functioned prior to the existence of the Internet, the latter 
has contributed to the successful expansion of Clearing. 
 
Results of an excellent credit rating system 
 
Being a user-friendly and low cost provider has led to high growth in the last few years.  
There are now over 3 million credit requests per year in an economically active 
population of 1.4 million people –believed to be the highest credit reporting rate per-
capita in Latin America. 
 
As a result of the confidence that Clearing has engendered, commercial banks and 
finance companies are fighting with each other to lend to small business and to 
consumers.  There is also the rise of other more informal companies lending to higher 
risk groups at higher rates. 
 
Starting with the access of lower rates because Uruguay has “Investment Grade”, “the 
costs of providing credit are among the lowest in Latin America,” according to executives 
of Clearing due to the availability of their services.  “The delinquency rate is below 3% 
indicating relatively low risk.  Knowing the payment habits of the borrower is extremely 
important and is in some ways more important than knowing the income stream or 
collateral base.”  It is observed that poor people often value credit more and take greater 




The explosion of credit in recent years has coincided with the recent purchase of Clearing 
de Informes by the Exxel Group in July of 1998.  A number of international credit 
agencies seem interested in Clearing.  It is unclear if this change in ownership structure 
will affect future operations.  There is also some concern that this information is all in 
private hands.  The banking supervision system has not been involved in a formal way. 
 
One of the challenges for the future is developing a good database on companies as well 
as individuals.  At the micro-enterprise level, there may be little difference between credit 
reporting on individuals and credit reporting on small companies and this information is 
typically harder to get. 
 
The impressive democratization of credit in Uruguay is the result of many factors but 
chief among them is the existence of an e xcellent credit-reporting bureau that has 
lowered the cost and risk of lending.  There are important lessons here for other countries 
where there is an interest in expanding access to credit.  One may conclude with the 
words taken from the founder of Clearing de Informes:  “Selling on credit is easy, 
selling correctly is difficult.”  To this one could add that lending resources to low-
income consumers and micro-entrepreneurs is easy.  Lending correctly is difficult.  RISK MITIGATION AS A COST-EFFECTIVE MICRO-FINANCE STRATEGY 
 
29   
Establishing the architecture by which private companies compete with each other to 
intelligently lend to this sector is even more difficult. 